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Abstract:
This paper considers a vertical manufacturer-retailer interaction in a content of
asymmetric information. The monopolist manufacturer is privately informed about the
intensity of consumer demand which may be high or low. In addition to the state of
nature, consumer demand responds to the retail pria and advertising by the
manufacturer. The vertical interaction is modelled as a signalling game, in which the
manufacturer initially sets a wholesale price and a level of advertising. The retailer
infers information from the observable choices of the manufacturer and responds by
setting a retail price. By refining retailer inferences, we show that the game óas a
unique equilibrium outcome where all information is revealed by the manufacturer's
choices. When consumer demand is high, the manufacturer chooses the full-
information pair of wholesale-price and advertising. In contrast, to induce the right
beliefs, the low-demand manufacturer is forced to distort the price-advertising pair by
behaving as if demand is even lower. As a consequence, the wholesale pria is
distorted downward, whereas demand-enhancing advertising may be distorted in either
direction. Dissipative advertising is not distorted since it is never used.
Key words: Manufacturer-Retailer Relations, Demand Uncertainty, Signalling,
Wholesale Pricing and Advertising, Equilibrium Refinements.
JEL: C72, D82, L121
1. Introduction
Vertical interactions between manufacturers and retailers often take place against a
background of asymmetric information about final demand. In the setting of this paper
we assume that for some exogenous (e.g. legal) reason a monopolist manufacturer is
prevented from integrating forwazd into retailing but is forced to operate through a
network of geographically dispersed retailers with local monopolies. Geographic
dispersion is modelled very simply by assuming that consumers in one region are
prevented by distance from making their pwchases in another region. Mazket demand
in each region is affected by economy-wide shocks, and we assume that the
manufacturer has obtained complete and perfect information about demand intensity
during market research. Local retail monopolists, on the other hand, are incompletely
informed about the state of demand.
We focus on the following simple setting. Since regional retail markets are
independent we analyse a representative market in this paper.' Assume that demand
intensiry is either high or low, and that the manufacturer is privately informed about
the actual intensity. It follows that the retailer will attempt to infer information from
the observable actions of the informed manufacturer in order to set the level of its
choice variables optimally. We shall assume that the choice variable of the retaíler is
the retail price, whereas, the manufacturer chooses a wholesale price and (possibly) a
positive level of advertising. Final consumer demand depends on the state of nature,
the retail price and level of advertising.
At a formal level, we model the following sequence of moves. Before any market
interactions take place nature chooses the intensity of consumer demand, and the
manufacturer is fully informed about nature's choice. Next, the manufacturer sets a
wholesale price and a level of advertising, and both are fully observed by the retailer.
The retailer dces not, however, observe nature's choice, but attempts to infer
information from the observable actions of the manufacturer. Then, the retailer sets a
retail price on the basis of its (possibly updated) beliefs about demand. Finally, the
retailer (and, hence, the manufacturer) serves whatever demand is forthcoming at the
posted price. The sequence of moves modelled constitutes a signalling game and we
invoke refinements of sequential equilibrium to select outcomes. Formal defuutions
follow Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Cho and Kreps (1987).
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which the choice variables of
the informed manufacturer are distorted compared to the case of full retailer2
information. Now, there are two rypes of manufacturers distinguished by their
observations of actual demand, and we will refer to them as the high-demand type and
the low-demand type. From the case of full information we can easily conclude that
(subject to assumptions about the cost functioas) a manufacturer has an interest in
selling as many uníts as possible. So, it is in the interest of the manufacturer that the
retailer charges a low retail price. Consequently, when we move to an asymmetric
information structure, both types of the manufacturer have an incentive to signa! that
actual demand is low since this induces the retailer to charge a low price. Hence, the
retailer and a low-demand manufacturer are confronted with an adverse selection
problem. To alleviate this problem and allow a correct retailer inference, the low-
demand manufacturer is forced to choose a combination of wholesale price and
advertising level that it does not pay the high-demand manufacturer to copy.
Otherwise manufacturer strategies are non-revealing and the two types aze pooled.
The signalling game considered generally has a multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes
supported by either separating or pooling equilibrium strategies. But, once we rule out
equilibrium dominated strategies in the sense of Cho and Kreps (1987), we conclude
that a unique separating outcome remains. At this equilibrium outcome, the high-
demand manufacturer reverts to the full-information combination of wholesale price
and advertising. The low-demand manufacturer, on the other hand, chooses its signals
so as to induce a demand-reducing distortion (in the terminology of Bagwell and
Ramey (1990)). By a demand-reducing distortion is understood that the low-demand
manufacturer chooses the opdmal pair of wholesale price and advertising of a
hypothetical manufacturer with even lower demand when retailers react as if demand
is at the actual level (i.e. low). We show that this ímplies adownward distortion in the
wholesale price whereas directly demand-enhancing advertising may be distorted in
either direction. However, if advertising is purely dissipative (as in Milgrom and
Roberts (1986)) its level is set to zero, and, hence, is not distorted
The analysis in this paper is related to the rapidly expanding literature on signalling in
economics originating in the Spence-model (see the seminal paper by Spence (1973)
and the game theoretic treatment by Kreps (1984)). Of particular interest are the
papers of Milgrom and Roberts on limit-pricing by a privately informed incumbent in
response to potential entry (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982) and on price and advertising
as signals of product quality (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986). These papers introduce
various refinements to select equilibria that point to a unique separating equilibrium
outcome (when sepazating equilibria exist). The qualitative features of the market
distortions resulting from private information are very similar to those spelled out3
above. Most closely related to the present paper are two papers by Bagwell and
Ramey (1988, 1990) that extend the Milgrom and Roberts (1982) analysis of limit
pricing.
Bagwell and Ramey (1988) consider the role of pre-entry price and advertising in
signalling whether incumbent-costs are low or high. They conclude that the price-
advertising pair of a low-cost incumbent constitutes a cost-reducing distortion. They
show that at most one separating outcome as well as a continuum of outcomes where
the different types of the incumbent are pooled survive the equilibrium refïnements of
Cho and Kreps (1987). T'his contrasts the present analysis where separation is always
possible and all pooling equilibria are destabilized. Pooling equilibria survive in
Bagwell and Ramey (1988) because the uninformed player's response is a map from
beliefs into a dichotomous entry choice, which allows the informed player to provoke
its unique preferred response (í.e. non-entry) even in a pooling equilibrittm In the
present paper such a prefened response is ruled out under pooling, and this
establishes a unique separating outcome.
Bagwell and Ramey (1990) develop a model of entry deterrence (or accommodation)
when the competitors of the incumbent are incompletely informed about consumer
demand. In sttvcture their model is very similar to the vertical game considered in this
paper, in the sense that the response map of the uninformed player is smooth, and the
qualitative results correspond. In one version of their model the incumbent has
incentives to signal low demand to ensure entry on a small scale.' The incumbent uses
the pre-entry price and advertising level as signals, and Bagwell and Ramey conclude
that a low-demand incumbent chooses signals to induce a demand-reducing distortion.
As a consequence, the pre-entry price is distorted downward (viz. ~imit-pricing")
whereas advertising may be distorted in either direction.'
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 formalizes the vertical interaction.
Then, in section 3 the set of separating eyuilibria is analyscd. Pinally, we turn to
pooling equilibria in section 4. A few concluding remarks are contained in section 5.
Proofs are in the appendix.
2. The Model
As outlined in the introduction the monopolist manufacturer supplies his product to a
monopolist retailer, who in turn serves the demand of an anonymous mass of price
taking final consumers. We assume that the final consumer demand is of the form a'4
t x(p,A) where i e{L,H}, and a` ~ a". We refer to demand as being low or lrigh.
The retail price p e!Q, is chosen by the retailer while the manufacturer chooses the
level of adverdsing A e)e,. x(p,A) is assumed to be continuous, strictly decreasing in
p, and non-deaeasing in A. We allow for the possibility that advertising is dissipative,
that is, that A has no effect on demand. Besides A the manufacturer chooses a
wholesale price w e R,. Thus we assume that the manufacturer has all bazgaining
power, since the retailer has no say in determining w. To economize on notation unit
costs of production and retailing are set to zero while the cost of advertising is simply
A.' The profit to the retailer is then (p-w)[a' t x(p,A)] while the profit to the type i
manufacturer is w[a' f x(p,A)] - A.
The crucial assumption concerning the structure of information in this paper is that
before any market interaction takes place, the manufacturer obtains complete and
perfect information about the value of the shift parameter a`, whereas the retailer
remains uninformed about the realization of a'. The retailer's prior probability
assessment about the value of a' is specified as Prob(a") - p' and Prob (a`) - 1-
p', p' e(0,1). We assume that p' is rnmmon knowledge. After observing the
manufacturer's wholesale and advertising choice (w,A) the retailer forms a posterior
belief p(w,A) e[0,1] about the probability that demand is high. Using this belief the
retailer then maximizes expected profit (both manufacturer and retailer are risk
neutral), that is, he solves the problem
max p(P-w)[a"tx(RA)] ' (1-P)(P-w)Ia`tx(P,A)]
with respect to p. We assume that this problem has a unique solution which we call
p(w,A,p), p ~ w. It is easy to show that this function is strictly increasing in both w
and p. We furthermore assume it to be continuous in all arguments.
Throughout the paper we shall restrict attention to pure strategy equilibria. Then, the
collection {(w",.~"), (w`,Ê1`), p, p(w,A)} forms a sequential equilibrium (Kreps and
Wilson, 1982) if the following conditions are satisfied
i) Optimality for the retailer
P - P(w,A,P(w,A))
ii) Optimality for the manufacturer
(~`,t1`) E argmax w[a'tx(P(w,A,á(w.A)),A)] - A
iii) Beliefs are Bayes-consistent;
a) if (w",Á") ~ (w`,Á`)5
then ~(w",A") - 1 and p(w`,Á`) 3 0
b) if (w",Á") - (w`,A`)
then V(W",A") - P(w`~A`) - P`
c) if (w,A) ff {(w",A"), (w`,A`)}
then any P(w,A) E[0,1] is consistent
The relatively weak requirements on belief systems give rise to the familiar
multiplicity of equilibria in this model. In the foilowing sections we progressively
refine these beliefs (i.e. those in iii.c) in order to narrow down the set of sustainable
equilibria.
We introduce the notation -rr'(w,A,p) - w[a` t x(p(w,A,p),A)] - A. Let (w",A") be the
unique maximizer of ~(w,A,l) and (w`,A`) the unique maximizer of Tr`(w,A,O) where
w' ~ 0, A' z 0. Hence, (v~,A`) is the full information solution when ~- d and the
retailer knows this. ~(w",A",1) and ~rr`(w`,A`,0) aze then the full information profits
of, respectively, the high and the low type manufacturer.
3. Separating Equilibria
In this section we first characterize the set of sequential separating equilibria, and
then move on to define and explore the notion of an undominated equilibrium. We
show that there is an unique undominated sequential separating equilibrium.
Before moving on to the analysis, let us recapitulate the incentives for the high type
manufacturer to mimic the low type. As seen in the previous section, the retail price is
strictly increasing in p, the posterior probability that demand is high. Since demand is
strictly decreasing in p and the manufacturer wants to sell as much as possible given w
and A, both types of the manufacturer would like the retailer to believe that demand
is low. Hence, for a wide range of wholesale prices and advertising levels the type H
manufacturer will find it profitable to mimic the low type. To avoid this a separating
equilibrium pair (w`,Á`) for type L will be distorted from the full information pair,
(w`,A`), as we shall see shortly.
By definition, in any separating equilibrium (w",Á") .(w`,Á`) It follows from Bayes-
consistency that p(w",Á") - 1 and p(w`,Á`) - 0. Cleazly, in any sequential sepazating
equilibrium (w",Á") -(w",A"), that is, in rnntrast to the low type, the type H
manufacturer adopts his full information solution. To see this, note that if it was not
the case, deviating to the full information solution would always give greater profits to6
type H, since ~(w",A",P(w",A")) a~(w",A".1) ~~(w,A,l) for all (w,A) r(~L"~").
To characterize the set of separating equihbrium pairs of type L we follow usual
practice by setting p(w,A) - 1 for all (w,A) r(w`,À`), i.e. any (w,A) different from
the equilibrium choice of the type L manufacturer triggers the retailer beGef that
demand is high with certainty. Since this is the least favourable out-of-eyuilibrium
belief from the point of view of the manufacturer it will support the largest
conceivable set of separating equilibrium pairs of wholesale prices and advertising
levels for type L Note that this system of beliefs is Bayes-consistent.
For a pair (w`,À`) to be part of an equilibrium it must be true that the high type dces
not prefer to mimic the low type and choose (w`,À`) over choosing his full information
solution. Define the set H as {(w,A)~~(w,A,O) s~(w",A",1)}. Hence, H is the set
of (w,A) to which type H would not deviate from (w",A") even if the retailer would
infer that a- a`. We see that (w`,À`) e H is a necessary condition for equilibrium.
We also need to ensure that the type L manufacturer will adhere to his eyuilibrium
strategy. Now, the profit from the best possible deviation' by type L will be max
Tr`(w,A,l) since p(w,A) - 1 for all (w,A) r(w`,À`). We then define the set L-as
{(w,A)~~(w,A,O) Z m~x~r`(w,Ê1,1)}. Hence, with (w`,À`) in L, type L will have no
incentive to deviate. -
The argumenu above have established that necessary conditions for a separating
equilibrium are (w",À") -(w",A") and (w`,À`) e H fl L To see that these conditions
are also sufficient, note that any such configuration can be sustained as an equilibrium
by setting p(w,A) - 1 for all (w,A) r(w`,À`).
Later we shall show that sequential separating equilibria always exist. In fact, the set
H fl L will typically be very large so that we get the multiplicity of sequential
equilibrium outcomes usually encountered in signalling games of the kind considered
in this paper. As noted earlier the main reason for this problem is the weakness of the
consistenry requirement embodied in the definition of sequential equilibria. In
particular, only two points in the admissible space of pairs of wholesale prices and
advertising levels are associated with any particular equilibrium. Hence, Bayes-
consistenry provides little help in specifying reasonable beliefs at out-of-equilibrium
points. Most notably, consistency dces not rule out that, following an out-of-
equilibrium move, the retailer attaches a high probability to a type for which that
move is dominated by some other move irrespective of the posterior beliefs.
Formally, we say that (w;A') is weakly dominated for type i if~(w',A-,0) 5 max ~(w,A,l)
~A
The notion of weak domination thus states that a pair (w',A') is dominated for type i
if the profits associated with (w;A') under the most favorable beliefs, p(w',A') - 0,
are no greater than the profits which can be obtained for sure under the least
favorable beliefs, p(w,A) - 1.
We introduce the following natural restriction on retailer beliefs. After observing a
pair (w,A) the uninformed retailer should assign zero probability to a type of the
manufacturer for whom (w,A) is weakly dominated, as long as (w,A) is not weakly
dominated for the other type. If a pair (w,A) is weakly dominated for both types of
the manufacturer, arbitrary beliefs, p(w,A) e[0,1] can be assigned. This leads us to
introduce the following equilibrium selection criterion:
An equilibrium is called undominated when p(w,A) - 1(0) if (w,A) is weakly
dominated for type L(H) but not for type H(L).
From the definition of the set H we know that for all (w,A) e H, ~(w,A,O) s
~(w",A",1). Hence, any (w,A) E H is weakly dominated for type H. Then, for all
points (w,A) in L fl H that are not weakly dominated for type L beliefs must be
p(w,A) - 0 according to the restriction above. It follows that in any undominated
separating equilibrium, (w`,A`) must maximize ~r`(w,A,O) over the set H. To make our
problem interesting we therefore assume that (w`,A`) ff H, that is, that the low type's
full information choice is not in H. If it were, it would of course trivially be chosen in
any undominated separating equilibrium.
In order to proceed to find (w`,Ê1`) when (w`,A`) ff H it is useful to introduce two
auxiliary profit expressions. First, define for any real number a
~(w,A I a) - ~v[a'x(P(w,A,O),A)] - A
Hence, -rr(w,A ~ a) gives the profit to a manufaMurer with demand parameter a from
choosing (w,A) when the retailer with probabiliry 1 believes that the true value of a is
a`. Let ~j(a) -(w(a),A(a)) be the pair which uniquely maximizes -rr(w,A~a), and
assume that ~(a) is continuous. In the appendix we show that w(a) is strictly
increasing in a. However, in general it is not possible to say that A(a) is monotonic,
even when A is strictly demand enhancing. Denote by a(~r(a)~a") the profit to the
high demand manufacturer from choosing the maximizing pair ~r(a) of the type a, that
is, the pair (w(a),A(a)) which type a would choose if the retailer for sure thinks a-8
a`. Hence
~(~V(a)la") - w(a)Ia"tx(p(w(a),A(a)A)A(a))J - A(a)
Note that p- 0, that is the retailer believes with certainty that a - a`. We make the
technical assumption that there exists an a t a" such that ~(a) a 0 and ~r(~(a)~a")
~ ar"(w",A",1). Thus, as a gets sufficiently small the high type manufacturer will
prefer his full information solution to choosing ~r(a) even if the retailer thinks a- a`.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 1: There exists a unique undominated sepazating equilibrium outcome in
which (w",Á") -(w",A") and (w`,Á`) -(wL),AL)) for some a ~ a`.
Proof: See Appendix.
The theorem establishes that the sepazating equilibrium wholesale price of the low
demand type manufacturer is biased downwards relative to the full information case,
whereas the wholesale price and advertising level of the high demand type aze
unbiased. In general, it is not possible to determine the d'uection of the distortion, if
any, on the advertising level of type L However, it is clear that if advertising is
dissipative, that is, has no direct demand-enhancing effects, then A(a) - 0 for all a,
and we have that Á` - A` - 0. Furthermore, if A(a) is strictly increasing in a, which
is probably the most natural conjecture, then Á` - A(a) ~ A` - A(a`). Hence,
advertising is biased downwards.
4. Pooling Equilibria
We have seen that the vertical mazket game of this paper has a unique, undominated
separating equilibrium outcome. However, in general there remains a multiplicity of
undominated pooling equilibria. In this section we show that invoking a more refined
equilibrium notion than domination eliminates these equilibria.
The set of pooling equilibrium strategies consists of strategies (w,Á) where
~(w,A,P") z ~(w",A",1)
and ~(w,A,p") z max ~(w,A,l)
To support the largest set of equilibria we have again assumed p(w,A) - 1 for all
(w,A) r(w,Á). This set may be very large, indeed, although it may aLco be empty if
the prior p' is sufficiently high.9
We now proceed to characterize the set of undominated pooling equilibria. Denote by
H"(P') the set {(w,A)~Tr"(w,A,P') a ar"(w",A",1)}. C1earlY (w,A) E H'(P') is a
necessary condition for type H to stay in a proposed pool. Denote by LP(p') the set
{(w,A)~~(w,A,p') z~r`(w,~0} where (w,A) -(wL), A(a)) as defïned in Section 3.
Since (w,A) is weakly dominated for H and not for L we must have p(w,A) - 0 in any
undominated equilibrium.
Hence, type L can always secure himself ~(w,A,O) and any undominated equilibrium
must give him at least this profit. We conclude that in any undominated equilibrium
(w,Á) e L"(p') n H"(p'). In fact we can prove the following theorem, which uses that
L"(p') is a subset of H'(p').
Theorem 2: Any (w,A) e L"(p') can be supported as an undominated pooling
equilibrium strategy.
Proof: See Appendíx.
We see that elimination of dominated strategies does not in general eliminate the
multiplicity of equilibria. For low values of p' a large set of undominated equilibrium
outcomes will exist. In fact, we typically end up with an infinity of equilibrium
outcomes. In these cases the predictive power of the model is still limited. We
therefore turn to consider a more elaborate information processing system on the part
of the retailer.
In the following we argue that the remaining pooling equilibria in L'(p') aze
destabilized if the retailer forms beliefs in a slightly more "sophisticated" manner. To
formalize this argument we adapt some of the notions and ideas of Cho and Kreps
(1987) to fit our context.
A system of beliefs, p(w,A), that supports an undominated pooling equilibrium (w,Á),
is said to be non-sensible, if there exists a pair (w;A') M(w,Á) such that
1) ~(w',A',0) ~ ~(W,A,P`)
2) ~(w;A',0) ~ ~(~,A,P')
Hence, inequality 1) expresses that type H prefers his equilibrium choice (w,Á) to
(w;A') even if (w',A') is followed by the most favourable beliefs p(w',A') - 0,
whereas inequality 2) states that type L prefers the out-of-equilibrium "message"
(w,A'), if that message convinces the retailer that demand is actually low.10
If the inequalities 1) and 2) are satisfied simultaneously, the equilibrium associated
with (w,À) can only be supported by a system of beliefs that assigns p(w;A') ~ 0,
which we think non-sensible. We rule out such beliefs, and an equilibrium is only said
to be refined if it can be supported by beliefs that are no-where non-sensible. We can
then prove the following:
Theorem 3: No refined pooling equilibrium exists.
Proof: See Appendix.
Thus, the refinement of out-of-equilibrium beliefs along the lines suggested by Cho
and Kreps (1987), rules out pooling as a self-enforcing outcome in the signalling game
considered here. Intuitively, this result follows from the observation that, relative to
any proposed pooling equilibrium, the type L manufacturer can find a potentially
profïtable deviation that it would never pay the type H manufacturer to mimic. Faced
with a deviation from an expected equilibrium, a sophisticated retailer should realize
these different incentives and update beliefs accordingly. Hence, type L will in fact
deviate, and the pooling equilibrium is destabilized.
S. Concluslon
By inspecting the properties of the unique separating outcome of section 3, it is easily
verified that no potentially profitable deviations are available to type L which would
not be copied by type H. It follows that the separating equilibrium component is
refined, and we conclude that the vertical market game has a unique refined
equilibrium outcome. With the outcome is associated the pairs (w",Êl") - (w",A") and
(w`~A`) - (wL),AL)).
We can further conclude that the wholesale price of the type L manufacturer is biased
downwards relative to the full information price, w`, whereas the wholesale price of
type H is unbiased. Thus, averaging over the states of demand, the effect of
incomplete retailer information is to lower the observed wholesale and retail prices.
With respect to advertísing, the picture is less clear, even though we conclude that
type H chooses its full information level, A". Without adding further structure to the
demand side, we cannot in general determine the direction of the advertising
distortion by type L.
If, however, advertising is purely dissipative, the picture is clear since A` - A" - 0,ii
i.e., no distortions of advertising occur. Hence, the welfare effects of asymmetric
information aze unambiguous if we measure total 'welfaze' as the sum of manufacturer
profits, retailer profits, and consumer surplus. Wholesale and retail prices are lowered
on average and total welfare is increased. Tàis net increase in welfaze is composed of
a loss of profits to the type L manufacturer, whereas retailer profits and censumer
surplus increase. 7'hus, with dissipative advertising, the unambiguous improvement in
retailer profits resulting from asymmetric information provides a tentative explanation
of why it is left to the manufacturer alone to gather information in vertical relations of
the type considered here. In addition, since consumers with a low demand also gain by
keeping the retailer incompletely informed there is little a priori reason to expect
consumers to solve the manufacturer's problem by providing truthful information on
the state of their demand to the retailer.12
' An earlier version of this paper has been presented at seminars in Hamburg and
Tilburg, and we thank the participants for useful comments.
Notes
1. The extent to which the qualitative results of this paper carry over to a setting with
competition at the retail stage is left to future reseazch. However, we hazard the
conjecture that, with Bertrand compedtion between geographically dispersed and
incompletely ínformed retailers, the main qualitative results would continue to hold.
The validity of this conjecture clearly depends on the details of the model of retail
competition, but, with geographical dispersion the goods offered for sale by retailers
are imperfect substitutes, and mark-ups and retailer profits can be positive in
equilibrium, which is an important feature of the signalling game analyzed.
2. Bagwell and Ramey (1990) also consider a model where the incentives of the
incumbent are "turned upside down" so that a high demand is signalled. The
quantitative result are changed, but the qualitative features of equilibria aze
preserved.
3. Two remarks should be made at this point. First of all, separating equilibria may
fail to exist in the model of Bagwell and Ramey (1990), whereas existence is proved
for the present model (see the proof of Theorem 1). Secondly, Bagwell and Ramey
claim that both separating and pooling equilibria survive the equilibrium refinements,
and they state necessary conditions. However, these conditions are not sufficient, and
it turns out that the analysis can be strengthened considerably to prove that, under the
assumptions they make, no pooling equilibrium remains (this is shown in Albaek and
Overgaazd (1991)).
4. The introduction of constant unit costs of production and retailing would have no
effect on the qualitative results of the paper. The same holds for a general advertising
cost function.
5. We assume that such a best deviation exists.13
Appendiz
Proof of Theorem 1
We first show that w(a) is strictly increasing in a. Pick a, ~ a„ and let (w„A,) -
(w(a,), A(a,)), (w„A,) - (w(a,), Aía,)). Tlten
w,Ia~'x(P(w,,A,,O),A,) - A~ - w:(a~}x(P(w~~~0),A~] t A3 ~ 0
(Al) w~(a,tx(P(wr~,0),A,)1 - P4 - w~[a,tx(p(w,,~,0),~)1 t~~ 0
Add the inequalities to get
(w,-w~(a~-a~ ~ 0
Hence, w, ~ w,.
Now, assume a, ~ a, ~ a", and substitute a" into (AI)
w~[a"tx(P(wrA,,O),A,)] -?4 - w~[a"'x(P(w,.A,,O).A,)] t A, ~ 0
Hence, ~rr(i(a) ~ a") is strictly increasing in a for a ~ a". Since, by assumption, there
exists a ~ a" such that ~r(a) Z 0 and a(~j(a)~a") ~~(w",A",1), the above result and
the continuity of ~(a) tells us there exists a unique a ~ a" such that iL) z 0 and
~r(~rL)~a") -~(w",A",1). Since we have assumed that (w`,A`) - (w(a`), A(a`)) ff H
we must have -rr(,~(a`) ~a") ~~(w",A",1). Therefore we know that a ~ a`.
We now show that in any separating equilibrium ~(w`,t1`,0) -~(w",A",1). Suppose
not, and let (w,A) - (wL),A~a)). Then
~a"tx(P~~O),~) - A- Sv`Ia"tx(P(W`,A`,0),A`)I t Ê1` ~ 0
(A2) ~`Ia`tx(P(W~.,A`,0).Á`)1 - A~ - WIa`tx(Pí~!',~0),~) i A z 0





Substituting a ~ a` into (A2) gives
w`[atx(P(W`,Á`,0),~`)1 - A` - w[gtx(PL.~O)~1 t A~ 0
which is a contradiction since trL) maximizes ~rr(w,A~a). Thus, we must have14
~(vY`,A`,p) - ,~(w",p",1).
Now, we still need to show that (w,A) is the unique pair which maximizes ~r`{w,A,O)
under the condition that ~(w,A,O) - ar"(w",A",1). Therefore, pick any (w,A) M(w,,
such that Tr"(w,A,O) - ~(w",A",1). Then
wLfx(PL.~~),A)] - A- wL,x(p(w,A,O),A)] t A ~ 0







- W[a`'x(P(W,?~,0).A)] - A- w[a`ax(p(w,A.~),A)] 4 A
Add (A3) to get
w[a`tx(PL,~O),A)] - A- w(a`ix(P(w~A,~)~A)] t A
t w[a"tx(P(w.A,O),A)] - A-w(a"tx(pL~~~),~] t A
- (w-w)(a`-a") ~ 0
Hence, (w,A) -(wL),AL)) is the unique maximizer of ~(w,A,O) given ~(w,A,O) -
~(w",A",1).
To show the existence of the equilibrium we need to show that ~(a) is in L(by
definition; ~(a) e H). Suppose not. Define (w,Á) as the unique ma.~mi~pi of
ar`(w,A,l) - w(a`fx(p(w,A,l),A)] - A. Then
w[a`tx(P(W,f1,1),~)] -?~ - w[a`,x(PL.~~),~] t A~ 0
w[a"~x(P~~O),~] - A-~[a"tx(P(W,A,1),A)] t Á~ 0





Wjatx(P(W,A,1),A)] - Ê1 - wLtx(P~~~)~] t A ~ 0
which is a contradiction. Hence, (w,A) e L and a separating equilibrium exists. This15
Since x(p(~sv,t1,0),A) ~ x(p(J'v,Á,l),A) we get
~,Ltx(P(W,A,O),A)1 - A
- w[n.x(PL,~O),~] t A ~ 0
concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
Proofof Theorem 2
First we show that any (w,A) in L"(p') must also be in H"(p'). Suppose not, and
remember that ~(w,,~0) - ~r"(w",A",1). Then
w[a"tx(P~~O)~] - A- w[a"tx(P(w,A,P~.A)] t A~ 0






wLtx(p(w,A,P~,A)] - A- wLtx(PL.A.O),~] t A ~ 0
Since x(p(w,A,O),A) ~ x(p(w,A,p),A) we get
wLtx(P(w,A,O),A)] - A- wLtx(P(~~0),~) t A~ 0
which is a contradiction. The theorem is then proved by noting that the following
beliefs sustains the undominated pooling equilibrium:
`d(w,A) ff H(P~; P(w,A) - 0
`d(w,A) E H(P~`~P~; P(w,A) -1
(w,A) - (W,A); P(w.A) - P~
d(w,A)El-iP~`{w,A}; P(w,A) - 1.
Proof of Theorem 3
Fix arry undominated pooling equilibrium pair (w,ï~) e L"(p') such that p(w,Á) - p'.
Now, the earlier assumptions guarantee the existence of an á ~ a" such that
(Á4) ~[a"tx(P(W,~,P~,A)] - A - w(á)Ia"tx(P(w(á),A(á),0),A(á)]
t A(á) - 0
where (w(á ),A(á )) - ~(á ) E B;. By construction we also have16
(~) w(á)[~tx(P(w(~),A(~) ,0).A(~))] - A(á) -~[~tx(p(~.A,P~,A)] t A~ o





w[a`tx(p(W,A.P~,A)] - A- w(á)[a`tx(p(w(á),A(á),0),A(~))] t A(~)
Subtract (A4) to obtain
(w-w(à))(a`-~") ~ 0
Hence, the low type strictly prefers ~(á) to the pooling pair if beliefs are updated to
p(~r(á )) - 0. By continuity, we can find points (w,A) in a close neighbourhood of
~(á) that are strictly non-preferred by the high type and strictly preferred by the low
type if beliefs are updated to p(w,A) - 0. Hence, (w,Á) collapses. ~17
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